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Abstract 
Alesina and Giuliano (J. Econ. Growth, 15(2), 2010) illustrate that strong family ties lead to 
lower geographical mobility and reduced labor force participation of young and female 
individuals. We extend their analysis by arguing that the effect of strong family ties on 
economic outcomes depends on a country’s level of economic and institutional development. 
This cross-country heterogeneity arises because strong family ties not only foster traditional 
family values (which have disruptive effects on economic outcomes), but also provide 
economically valuable social networks – especially in societies characterized by weak 
institutions and limited market access. Empirical evidence using the European and World 
Value Surveys (EVS/WVS) is supportive of our theoretical argument. 
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Introduction 
Alesina and Giuliano (2010) show that strong family ties are causally related to several 
factors disruptive to economic growth, including lower labor force participation of young and 
female individuals and lower geographical mobility (see also Alesina & Giuliano, 2013; 
Alesina, Algan, Cahuc & Giuliano, 2015). Subsequent studies illustrate similar negative 
effects of strong family ties on the labor force participation of elderly individuals, on 
individuals’ interpersonal trust (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010; Alesina & Giuliano, 2011, 2013) 
and on overall economic dynamism (Duranton & Rodriguez-Pose, 2009). 
In this article, we maintain that allowance should be made for cross-country heterogeneity 
in the effect of family ties (for similar claims in different settings, see Gërxhani, 2004; 
Cervellati, Jung, Sunde, & Vischer, 2014). The underlying argument starts from the 
observation that existing studies’ theoretical reasoning mostly refers to the connection 
between strong family ties and (traditional) family values. For instance, female labor force 
participation (LFP) is argued to decline with strong family ties because it is associated with a 
more traditional view of a woman’s role in society (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010). However, in 
our view, family ties can also play a key role in the establishment of economically valuable 
networks (Wahba & Zenou, 2005) via, for instance, marriages (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989; 
Luke, Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2004; Wang, 2011). Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), for 
instance, show that marital arrangements, which establish a new network with the family of 
the spouse, mitigate farmers’ income volatility in rural India. Luke et al. (2004) similarly find 
that family networks, again organized around marriages, increase individuals’ performance in 
urban labor markets in both Kenya and India. Wang (2011) uses the exogenous shock of the 
death of the father-in-law to show the causal effect of family networks on earnings; the loss 
of the father-in-law is found to induce a 7% decrease in a man’s earnings. Hence, family-
based networks reflect a capacity to extend one’s connections, and might thereby allow 
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access to economically valuable opportunities (Montgomery, 1991, Munshi, 2003, Wahba & 
Zenou, 2005).
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Crucially, family networks are likely to matter more for economic outcomes in developing 
countries. At a risk of generalization, developing countries tend to have weaker formal 
institutions (Dreher et al., 2014). As informal institutions – such as the family – become a 
substitute for formal institutions when the latter are incomplete (Gërxhani, 2004; Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2004; Dreher, Méon & Schneider, 2014), family networks can play a central role 
for individuals’ social and economic needs in such settings. This implies, however, that any 
positive effect of family networks on labor market outcomes (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989; 
Luke et al., 2004; Wang, 2011) will be particularly forceful in developing countries. Even 
when there is a general negative impact of traditional family values on LFP (as argued in 
Alesina & Giuliano, 2010, 2013; Alesina et al., 2015), the overall effect of strong family ties 
thus is likely to still vary across countries depending on their level of economic and 
institutional development. Specifically, one would expect weaker disruptive effects of strong 
family ties on economic behavior in less affluent, underdeveloped countries. 
A similar argument can also be made for the link between strong family ties and 
individuals’ interpersonal trust. Strong family ties are generally argued to reduce the need for 
social contacts with people outside the family, because individuals’ needs are taken care off 
within the family (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010; Alesina & Giuliano, 2013). This closed 
network undermines individuals’ ability to judge others’ trustworthiness (thereby reducing 
interpersonal trust), and decreases their access to opportunities outside the family (impeding 
their economic progress).
2
 Yet, this line of argument again pays too little attention to the 
potential role of family networks in developing, low-income countries. In such settings, as 
mentioned, the network effects induced by strong family ties emphatically increase people’s 
contact possibilities outside the family and buttress the availability of economically valuable 
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opportunities (Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989; Luke et al., 2004; Wang, 2011). As before, 
therefore, the effect of strong family ties on social trust is likely to display cross-country 
heterogeneity depending on countries’ levels of economic and institutional development. 
Section 2 describes the dataset and estimation strategy employed to test for cross-country 
heterogeneity in the effect of family ties on economic outcomes. The main findings are 
summarized in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 contains a concluding discussion. 
 
1. Data and estimation approach 
Following Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2011, 2013), our empirical analysis is based on data 
from all currently completed waves of the EVS/WVS. This dataset covers 99 countries and 
roughly 220.000 individuals (though not all countries are represented in every wave). Using 
these data, we estimate the following regression equation (where i refers to individuals and t 
to survey waves): 
 
Yi,t = a + b1 Family Tiesi,t + b2 Controlsi,t + ei,t (1) 
 
Yi,t is a vector containing measures of young, female and elderly labor force participation 
(i.e. indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent is active in the labor market, 0 otherwise), 
geographical mobility (i.e. indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is co-resident in 
his/her parents’ house; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010) and interpersonal trust (i.e. indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the respondent believes that most people can be trusted). The actual 
survey question on interpersonal trust reads: “Generally speaking would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. Respondents 
can either agree with the former part of the statement (in which case they are coded as 1 in 
our trust measure), or with the latter part of the statement (in which case they receive value 
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0). Note also that young (elderly) individuals are defined as between 15 and 29 (55 and 65) 
years of age. 
Our measure of the strength of family ties combines information from three separate survey 
questions (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010, 2011, 2013; Alesina et al., 
2015). These are, respectively, related to family’s importance to the respondent, his/her 
evaluation of the duties and responsibilities of parents towards children, and his/her 
evaluation of children’s duties and responsibilities towards their parents.3 We combine these 
questions using a principal components analysis (PCA), and employ the first principal 
component as our main explanatory variable.
4
 As shown in detail by Alesina and Giuliano 
(2013), Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries rank lowest on the resulting scale, while a 
heterogeneous group of African, Asian and South American countries rank highest. It is clear 
from the questions employed (see note 3) that our analysis is predominantly based on 
measures of family values and does not explicitly introduce a direct measure of family 
networks. Still, our underlying assumption is that the strength of family values is related 
positively to the strength of family networks. Although the two concepts are clearly different, 
it is plausible to assume a positive correlation between them, which is all we require for the 
analysis below. 
The vector Controlsi,t contains variables reflecting individuals’ sex, age, age squared, 
marital status and education, as well as country and survey fixed effects and the interaction of 
survey and country fixed effects. Although this follows Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2013), 
we also experimented with a more extended set of controls incorporating individuals’ income 
and religiosity. As this does not affect any of the inferences below, we do not report these 
additional results in detail here. Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 1. 
________________ 
Table 1 about here 
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________________ 
To test for cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of family ties, we run equation (1) for 
different subcategories of countries depending on their level of economic and institutional 
development using the World Bank development classification.
5
  This classification is based 
on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, and separates four groups of countries: i.e. low 
income, low-medium income, upper-medium income and high income. Although we test the 
robustness of our results to this classification below, we use it in the main analysis for three 
reasons. First, it is a well-established indicator of countries’ development. Second, GNI per 
capita is strongly positively correlated with the strength of formal institutions, which 
represents the key driving force behind our theoretical argument in section 2. Finally, the 
World Bank classification started in 1987 and is updated annually. This allows incorporating 
countries’ development over time, which is important since the majority of countries in our 
sample (i.e. 60 out of 99) switches category over the four decades covered by our analysis 
(note that such switches are not necessarily upwards). Figure 1 illustrates means and standard 
deviations of the family ties’ variable in the four groups of countries. In line with Alesina and 
Giuliano (2010, 2013), family ties weaken with a countries’ level of development, although, 
importantly, significant variation remains within each group of countries. 
________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
________________ 
Before discussing the results, it is important to note that Alesina and Giuliano (2010) deal 
extensively with the problem of reverse causality – i.e. the fact that individuals suffering 
economic misfortune need to rely more heavily on their family’s resources, which might 
impact their perception of family ties – by looking at inherited family ties among a subsample 
of second-generation immigrants. The key identifying assumption is that the strength of 
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family ties is generally persistent across generations and is related to historical family 
structures (Galasso & Profeta, 2012). To preserve space, and because we rely on the same 
dataset as Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2013), our analysis will not repeat these causality 
tests. 
 
2. Results 
2.1. Baseline results 
Table 2 reports our main findings using OLS.
6
 In column 1, we employ the full sample of 
countries as in Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2011, 2013). Columns 2 to 5 report results for, 
respectively, the subsample of low income (column 2), low-middle income (column 3), 
middle-upper income (column 4) and high income (column 5) countries. To preserve space, 
and because they are generally equivalent to those reported in Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 
2011, 2013), we do not present the coefficients of the control variables. 
________________ 
Table 2 about here 
________________ 
Column 1 shows that the effect of strong family ties on the different dependent variables in 
the entire sample is similar, both in terms of effect size and statistical significance, to Alesina 
and Giuliano (2010, 2011, 2013).
7
 Specifically, family ties have a negative and substantively 
meaningful effect on social trust, geographical mobility, female and youth LFP, but do not 
significantly affect elderly LFP. The remaining columns in Table 2, however, indicate that 
this negative relation is mostly driven by developed, high-income countries. Indeed, while all 
coefficient estimates in column 5 are negative and statistically significant (except for elderly 
LFP), moving towards less developed, lower income countries leads to substantively and/or 
statistically weaker effect sizes for female and young LFP. For the measures of geographical 
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mobility and interpersonal trust, the negative effect of strong family ties is even reversed 
when the level of development is sufficiently low. Except for elderly and female LFP, we can 
thereby formally reject at conventional levels of statistical significance that the effect of 
strong family ties is the same across all countries.  
These findings should not be interpreted as a rebuttal of Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2011, 
2013). Our results do, however, provide a valuable extension by confirming important cross-
country heterogeneity in the effect of family ties – especially when looking at countries with 
the lowest levels of economic and institutional development. Note also that these results 
cannot be explained by potential differences in the level of variation observed in family ties 
across the four subsamples – and particularly within the low-income countries. Figure 1 
above indeed illustrates that significant variation exists within each group of countries, and 
that there are only marginal differences in the observed standard deviations across groups. 
The exception posed by the results on female LFP – where the estimated effect sizes are 
roughly equivalent across all country groups – is interesting from a theoretical perspective. 
This indeed appears to suggest that the positive family networks effect counteracting the 
negative family values effect in low-income countries (see above) lacks substantive power for 
female LFP. Such interpretation could be in line with Magruder (2010), who shows that the 
labor market advantage of family networks in South Africa arises only for men, not for 
women. Family networks might thus be less useful for women than for men in low-income 
countries, which becomes reflected in the relative homogeneity of our findings across 
countries on this variable.
8
 Alternatively, however, it may also be that for female LFP, the 
negative family values effect strengthens in equal measure to the family networks effect 
while moving towards less developed countries.  
As a preliminary step towards disentangling both explanations, we experimented with 
individuals’ actual employment status (i.e. an indicator variable equal to 1 if employed, 0 
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otherwise) as an alternative dependent variable. Assuming that traditional family values 
mainly affect the decision to enter (or not) the labor market (see Alesina & Giuliano, 2010), 
looking at employment outcomes given that individuals participate in the labor force 
provides an indicator for the strength of family network effects on economic outcomes. Using 
a Heckman selection model to account for the effect of family ties on female LFP (see 
above), the results indicate that strong family ties positively affect female employment only in 
developing low-income countries (details upon request). Although this is suggestive of the 
fact that women also benefit from a positive family networks effect, it clearly requires further 
confirmation in future research. 
 
2.2. Robustness check using alternative country classification 
In this section, we experiment with different measures of institutional quality to 
approximate economic and institutional development. Specifically, we consider three 
indicators included in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). These 
aggregate information from dozens of indicators, and are updated annually since 1996. The 
measures included here are: i) Government Effectiveness, which assesses the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, public services and the civil service as well as the 
degree of its independence from political pressures; ii) Regulatory Quality, which measures 
the government’s ability to formulate and implement high-quality policies and regulations; iii) 
Rule of Law, which evaluates “the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, www.govindicators.org).  
The WGI place each country in a percentile rank according to their position in the global 
ranking. Higher positions thereby reflect better outcomes. To align our presentation to that of 
previous tables, we use the original scores to divide countries in four distinct groups: i.e. low 
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quality institutions (0-25), low-middle quality institutions (26-50), upper-middle quality 
institutions (51-75) and high quality institutions (76-100). We then re-estimate equation (1) 
separately for these four groups of countries. The results concerning Government 
Effectiveness are provided in Table 3 (Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law provide similar 
findings, which are available upon request). Note that the sample is restricted here to data 
collected after 1995 since WGI data are available only since 1996. 
________________ 
Table 3 about here 
________________ 
Despite the shorter period and the alternative operationalization of countries’ level of 
development, the results in Table 3 are a close replication of those in Table 2. That is, strong 
family ties have a meaningful negative effect on trust, geographical mobility, female and 
youth LFP in countries with high-quality formal institutions. However, moving towards less 
developed countries in the left-hand side of the table generally weakens this negative relation, 
and in some cases reverses it. This confirms that our results are robust to different 
classifications of countries’ economic and institutional development. 
 
2.3. Robustness check on political engagement 
Our theoretical argument relies on the substantial potential economic value of family 
networks in less-developed countries. We can assess this theoretical mechanism by 
evaluating whether the link between family ties and non-economic outcomes (such as 
political interest and political engagement) differs depending on countries’ level of economic 
and institutional development. As the economic value of family networks should have no 
effect on non-economic outcomes, we would not expect to observe cross-country 
heterogeneity in the effect of family ties on non-economic outcomes. This test is inspired by 
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Alesina and Giuliano (2011), who show that the detrimental effects of strong family ties 
extend to political interest and political engagement. The underlying argument relies on 
Banfield’s (1958) theory of “amoral familism”, which holds that strong family ties might act 
as a substitute for interest in public affairs. All attention under such ‘amoral familism’ is 
directed inwards – i.e. towards the needs and aspirations of one’s immediate family circle – 
and leads to a disregard for external, non-family issues (for more details, see Alesina & 
Giuliano, 2011).  
In Table 4, we report the results from re-estimating model (1) using different measures of 
political participation as dependent variables.  For reasons of comparability, we thereby use 
the same dependent variables as Alesina and Giuliano (2011): i.e. interest in politics 
(measured on a 4-point scale from (1) ‘not at all interested’ to (4) ‘very interested’), and 
individuals’ likelihood to sign a petition, join a boycott, attend demonstrations and occupy 
buildings (measured on a 3-point scale including (1) ‘Would never do’, (2) ‘might do’ and (3) 
‘have done’). Table 4 follows the same basic pattern as table 2.9 
________________ 
Table 4 about here 
________________ 
The results in table 4 indicate that family ties negatively affect political participation for all 
dependent variables included in the analysis – in line with the original results reported in 
Alesina and Giuliano (2011). Importantly, this observation holds both for the entire set of 
countries (column 1), as well as the four subsets based on World Bank development 
categories (columns 2 to 5). Overall, this provides further substantiation of our results in 
tables 2 and 3, since a heterogeneous effect of family ties appears only on the (economic) 
variables targeted by our theoretical line of argument. 
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5. Conclusion 
Recent work has shown that strong family ties have a detrimental effect on several sources 
of economic growth including interpersonal trust, geographical mobility and young, female 
and elderly LFP (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010, 2011, 2013; Alesina et al., 2015). In this article, 
we have argued that allowance should be made for cross-country heterogeneity in this effect 
of family ties. The underlying idea is that in developing countries, where institutions and 
markets are weaker (Gërxhani, 2004; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Dreher et al., 2014), strong 
family ties will act as a substitute for the market and can have important – and economically 
valuable – network effects that counteract the negative effect of (traditional) family values. 
Our empirical analysis provides evidence in line with this idea. Strong family ties only 
have a substantive, statistically significant negative effect on labor force participation, trust 
and geographical mobility in developed high-income countries. This negative relation 
disappears – and can even reverse – at lower levels of development, where family networks 
become more economically valuable as a substitute for market access. These results are 
robust to different measures of economic development. Moreover, a robustness check on non-
economic outcomes corroborates that the observed heterogeneity may indeed derive from the 
economic value of family networks in under-developed countries. 
These results not only highlight the importance of accounting for the various, and 
sometimes contrasting, effects of strong family ties on economic behavior, but also raise a 
number of important avenues for future research. For instance, they emphasize the need for a 
deeper understanding of the exact relations and tradeoffs between formal and informal 
institutions (such as the family). While the family unit has rightly been recognized as central 
to economic behavior, our knowledge of how the role of family ties interacts with the effects 
of formal institutions remains overly limited. A recent exception to this general trend is 
Durante, Labartino and Perotti (2015), who show that a 1998 legislative reform in Italy 
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weakening the institutional constraints on the academic hiring process caused a significant 
increase in the prevalence and persistence of family-based hiring practices only in areas 
characterized by low civic capital. Similarly, Alesina et al. (2015) argue that the deregulation 
of formal labor market institutions “requires geographical mobility”, which in turn “requires 
relatively weak family ties”. Still, as we have shown, the negative link between strong family 
ties and geographical mobility holds only in a subset of affluent countries, such that the 
apparent general nature of their conclusion would require a more in-depth assessment in 
future research. 
Clearly, a better understanding of such interactions between formal and informal 
institutions is of critical importance to a more accurate design of public policies. In fact, since 
similar self-reported attitudes towards family ties lead to opposite outcomes depending on the 
socio-economic characteristics of the country, it is important for public policy-makers aiming 
at, for instance, labor market regulation, redistributive policies, education and welfare 
provision to properly account for the exact influence of family ties in their setting
10
.  
 
                                                          
1 A similar network mechanism has also been brought forward to explain the formation and success of political 
dynasties (Dal Bó, E.,Dal Bó, P. & Snyder, 2009; Daniele, 2015). Likewise, Mastrobuoni (2015) convincingly 
documents the economic value of network connections within the Italian-American mafia in the 1960s. 
2
 A large literature links interpersonal trust to economic growth and development. For a recent discussion of this 
extensive literature and an integrative contribution to it, see Bjørnskov and Méon (2013). 
3
 Specifically, the first question asks “How important is family in your life?”, and takes values from 1 (not 
important at all) to 4 (very important). The second question measures respondents’ agreement with one of two 
statements: (1) “One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it”; (2) 
“Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them”. The 
third and final question again measures respondents’ agreement with one of two statements: (1) “Parents have 
a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children”; (2) 
“It is the parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being”. 
4
 The eigenvalue of the first factor deriving from this PCA is equal to 1.24, and it explains 41.9% of the variance 
in responses. The factor loadings for each element included in the PCA exceeds 0.53. 
5
 For more information on this classification, see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/a-short-
history. Note also that while we report only the split-sample results in detail below, models with interaction 
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effects provide similar results. For ease of interpretation, Figure A.1 visualizes the marginal effect of family 
ties across the different country groups in these interaction models, which are estimated using multilevel 
models – where individuals (level 1) are nested within countries (level 2) and the family ties variable is 
interacted with the World Bank classification index (details available upon request). 
6
 Our results do not change if we use logit or probit models instead of OLS (available upon request). 
7
 The slight difference in our results is due to our specification of respondents’ marital status. Alesina and 
Giuliano set the indicator variable for married individuals to 1 only for individuals declaring to be “living 
together as married (but not married)”, while we also set it to 1 for married individuals. Although this does not 
affect any of the results reported below, and we can exactly replicate Alesina and Giuliano’s original results 
using their specification, we consider our operationalization more appropriate. 
8
 Magruder (2010) studies formal labour markets, and it is not intuitively clear whether similar gender 
differences in the labour market advantage of family networks would likewise arise in informal labour markets. 
Unfortunately, the EVS/WVS does not differentiate between formal and informal labour markets, which 
implies that we cannot empirically verify such potential formal-informal sector differences. This clearly 
remains an important avenue for future research. 
9
 Also in this case, we refer to Alesina and Giuliano (2011) for detailed tests of the direction of causality. 
10
 Interestingly, recent work has started taking limited steps towards such a line of research. Brumm and Brumm 
(2014), for instance, show that intra-family altruism might hinder economic reforms even in periods of 
economic crisis, while Alesina et al. (2015) model a game where societies characterized by strong family ties 
vote for stricter labor market regulation. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Family Ties (see Section 3 for details) 269085 8.76E-09 1.111511 -5.84373 0.789682 
Trust (see Section 3 for details) 405490 0.29075 0.454109 0 1 
LFP (see Section 3 for details) 405271 0.635197 0.481375 0 1 
Geographical Mobility (see Section 3 for details) 318494 0.275236 0.446634 0 1 
Interest in Politics 380171 2.640827 0.959913 4 1 
Sign Petition 379239 2.001566 0.816958 3 1 
Joining in Boycotts 368583 2.498189 0.658263 3 1 
Attending Demonstrations 377978 2.281715 0.745397 3 1 
Joining Strikes 302315 2.699152 0.559341 3 1 
Occupying Buildings 297367 2.829285 0.430827 3 1 
Age 413876 42.14841 16.7231 14 108 
Sex (1 for female, 0 for male) 419345 0.525424 0.499354 0 1 
Married (1 for married, 0 otherwise) 424099 0.045808 0.209068 0 1 
Education (1 for lower education, 2 for middle 
education, 3 for higher education) 338262 1.865442 0.739948 1 3 
Income (1 for lowest income, 10 for highest income) 308616 4.65622 2.438972 1 10 
Religiosity (1 if the respondent belongs to a religious 
denomination, 0 otherwise) 329054 0.79418 0.4043 0 1 
Survey Wave (1 for 1st wave, 6 for last wave) 424099 3.823836 1.487118 1 6 
World Bank development classification (see section 3 
for details) 420319 2.95035 1.032966 1 4 
Government Effectiveness (see section 3.2 for details) 311922 2.937157 1.010256 1 4 
Regulatory Quality (see section 3.2 for details) 320577 2.977016 1.027109 1 4 
Rule of Law (see Section 3.2 for details) 330136 2.766151 1.077019 1 4 
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Table 2: Main results on family ties, trust and economic outcomes 
 Entire Sample Low Income Low Middle 
Income 
Upper Middle 
Income 
High Income 
Trust 
Family Ties -0.006 0.014 -0.003 -0.008 -0.010 
 (6.67)** (5.03)** (1.50) (4.91)** (6.82)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.13 
N 218,465 28,385 48,853 59,512 78,330 
Women LFP 
Family Ties -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 
 (5.45)** (1.21) (2.50)* (3.66)** (3.42)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.20 
N 98,779 12,320 23,242 27,662 34,029 
Young LFP 
Family Ties -0.005 0.003 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 
 (3.61)** (0.82) (2.01)* (2.84)** (4.25)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.31 0.41 0.32 0.29 0.19 
N 44,601 7,144 11,969 13,229 11,708 
Geographical Mobility 
Family Ties -0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
 (4.34)** (1.10) (1.27) (1.95) (3.92)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.38 
N 44,601 29,655 43,468 40,931 44,875 
Elderly LFP 
Family Ties -0.005 0.000 -0.009 -0.001 -0.006 
 (1.89) (0.05) (1.35) (0.11) (1.47) 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.28 
N 27,182 2,058 5,470 7,653 11,431 
Note: OLS estimations, t-statistics based on robust standard errors between brackets. The dependent variables 
are: Trust - “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?” (1 if the respondent agrees that most people can be trusted); Female, 
Young and Elderly LFP are dummies equal to 1 if the respondent is active in the labor market, 0 otherwise; 
Geographical Mobility is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent lives with his/her parents. Countries are 
divided into four groups based on the World Bank development classification. Control variables in this 
model include gender, age, age squared, marital status, education level, survey fixed effects, country fixed 
effects and interactions between country and survey fixed effects. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Alternative operationalization of economic development 
 Low 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Lower Middle 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Upper Middle 
Government 
Effectiveness 
High 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Trust 
Family Ties 0.008 -0.003 -0.001 -0.011 
 (2.40)* (1.35) (0.31) (7.19)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.14 
N 21,516 45,223 50,869 77,066 
Women LFP 
Family Ties -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 
 (1.47) (1.47) (1.60) (4.28)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.19 
N 10,335 20,768 23,882 32,868 
Young LFP 
Family Ties 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 
 (1.08) (0.90) (2.63)** (3.62)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.14 
N 21,516 45,223 50,869 77,066 
Geographical Mobility 
Family Ties -0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.72) (0.64) (1.80) (3.43)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.37 
N 19,610 37,471 35,312 49,818 
Elderly LFP 
Family Ties -0.017 -0.010 0.002 -0.006 
 (1.80) (1.37) (0.41) (1.43) 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.28 
N 2,149 4,721 6,006 11,086 
Note: OLS estimations, t-statistics based on robust standard errors between brackets. The dependent variables 
are: Trust - “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?” (1 if the respondent agrees that most people can be trusted); Female, 
Young and Elderly LFP are dummies equal to 1 if the respondent is active in the labor market, 0 otherwise; 
Geographical Mobility is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent lives with his/her parents. Countries are 
divided into four groups based on Government Effectiveness (see Section 3.2 for details). Control variables 
in this model include gender, age, age squared, marital status, education level, survey fixed effects, country 
fixed effects and interactions between country and survey fixed effects. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Political Engagement 
 Entire Sample Low Income Low Middle 
Income 
Upper Middle 
Income 
High Income 
Interest in Politics 
Family Ties -0.013 -0.016 0.002 -0.024 -0.011 
 (7.05)** (2.71)** (0.43) (6.47)** (4.02)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.17 
N 212,931 28,490 47,915 55,254 77,788 
Sign Petition 
Family Ties -0.026 -0.037 -0.024 -0.032 -0.040 
 (17.21)** (7.94)** (6.55)** (11.06)** (17.41)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.28 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.25 
N 206,678 26,135 43,409 57,856 76,071 
Joining in boycotts 
Family Ties -0.045 -0.035 -0.028 -0.039 -0.055 
 (33.22)** (8.68)** (9.06)** (15.61)** (25.62)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.20 
N 201,627 26,203 41,992 57,080 73,177 
Attending Demonstrations 
Family Ties -0.031 -0.022 -0.022 -0.023 -0.040 
 (20.81)** (4.48)** (6.19)** (8.17)** (17.41)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.17 
N 207,089 26,527 44,144 57,857 75,382 
Joining Strikes 
Family Ties -0.039 -0.041 -0.024 -0.037 -0.044 
 (31.73)** (10.52)** (9.42)** (16.00)** (22.89)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 
N 200,626 26,143 43,673 56,137 71,675 
Occupying Buildings 
Family Ties -0.028 -0.020 -0.011 -0.030 -0.034 
 (28.98)** (8.08)** (5.90)** (15.67)** (21.36)** 
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.11 
N 199,111 25,851 43,534 56,869 69,831 
Note: OLS estimations, t-statistics based on robust standard errors between brackets. ‘Interest in politics’ is 
measured as: “How interested would you say you are in politics? (from (1) not at all interested to (4) very 
interested). The remaining dependent variables derive from the following question: “I’m going to read out 
some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you 
have done any of these things (3), whether you might do it (2) or would never under any circumstances do 
it (1): Signing a petition; Joining in boycotts; Attending lawful demonstrations; Joining unofficial strikes; 
Occupying buildings or factories.” Countries are divided into four groups based on the World Bank 
development classification. Control variables in this model include gender, age, age squared, marital status, 
education level, survey fixed effects, country fixed effects and interactions between country and survey 
fixed effects. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
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Figure 1 – Family Ties Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Note: The x axis shows the four groups of countries distinguished by the World Bank 
development classification.  The y axis presents average levels and standard deviations of 
the family ties’ variable (higher values correspond to stronger family ties). 
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Appendix 
Figure A.1 – Marginal Effects of Family Ties 
 
 
Note: Each panel in this figure depicts the marginal effect of strong family ties on the dependent variable across 
the range of values taken by the World Bank development classification (on the x-axes; 1=low income, 
2=low-middle income, 3=upper-middle income and 4=high income). The dependent variables are: Trust - 
“Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?” (1 if the respondent agrees that most people can be trusted); Female, Young and 
Elderly LFP are dummies equal to 1 if the respondent is active in the labor market, 0 otherwise; 
Geographical Mobility is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent lives with his/her parents. We show the 
estimated effect size along with its 95% confidence interval.  
 
